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Becoming Lawyers in the Shadow of Brown
Akhil Reed Amart
Tonight is a time to look back on your three years as law students,
and look forward to your future as lawyers. What lies ahead? There
are many things you can do with a law degree, many professional lives
you can lead. Some of you will work in government, others for
nonprofits, still others in the private sector. Will you try cases, argue
appeals, or structure transactions? How much should you specialize?
In house or outside counsel? Big firm or boutique? Part time or full
time? These are some of the choices you confront. Topeka or not
Topeka-that too is a question.
I remember my own law journal banquet, sixteen years ago. My
friends and I tried to peer into our cloudy crystal balls and prophesy
the future. One friend predicted that the "A" students would become
professors, the "B" students would become judges, and the "c" students
would become rich. She was joking of course, but sh~ was nevertheless
onto something: we law professors do not rank among the wealthiest of
our classmates. But I like to think we are among the happiest. As I sit
in my office, I often say to myself, "boy, this sure beats working." Not
that I don't spend long hours at my job-it's just thatl love the hours I
spend. I do my job because I like it, because it fulfills me. I wish each
of you a professional career that fulfills your dreams, whatever they
maybe.
One of the best parts of my job is that I get to grade the Supreme
Court. Well, not exactly-but I do get the chance to reflect on what the
Justices have said, and to share my reflections with my students.
. .
Tonight, I would like to share with you some thoughts on the most
famous case of the twentieth century, a case from thisvery city, Topeka.
After sharing these thoughts, I hope to invite you to reflect on whether
this case can give you any guidance about the lives you will live after
you graduate from this place. ,
There are probably as many different legal academic perspectives
on Brown v. Board of Educationl as there are iegal academics: if you
+t Southmayd Professor, Yale Law School. What follows is the Foulston & Siefkin Lecture,
delivered at the annual banquet of the Washburn Law Journal on April 18,2000.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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laid all the law professors in America end to end, they would not reach
a conclusion. Each emphasizes a different facet of Brown, often a facet
reflecting his or her general jurisprudential framework. Consider just a
few examples. Alexander Bickel, who eschewed originalism, argued
that the Fourteenth Amendment's framers did not specifically intend to
outlaw racial segregation--{)n the contrary, they probably meant to
allow it-but (said Bickel) this fact should not bind the Brown judges,
who should feel free to evolve open-ended constitutional language to do
justice.2 Conversely, the originalist Michael McConnell has argued that
Brown can indeed be supported by a careful look at the legislative
history of the Reconstruction Congress.3 Bruce Ackerman thinks that
Brown is really all about the New Deal-isn't everythingt Whereas,
John Hart Ely insists that the case exemplifies his broader footnote-4
theory of facilitating the representation of minorities.5 Michael
Klarman has a narrower view of the proper judicial role, so he justifies
the biggest case of the century by stressing the key fact that American
blacks in 1954 were largely disfranchised and thus could not adequately
protect their own interests in the legislative process.6 David Strauss has
argued generally for constitutional gradualism, and so has Cass Sunstein
of late. They both accent yet a different aspect of Brown: the fact that it
was the culmination of a long series of cases, reflecting an evolution of
social attitudes.7 Here was no bolt from the blue, they emphasize.
Similarly, Edward Lazarus has argued that anti-death penalty crusaders
like, Anthony Amsterdam, saw in Brown the lesson that clever and
committed public interest lawyers could change the world by carefully
orchestrating an extended litigation campaign bringing a series of
lawsuits in just the right order.8 Lazarus himself is skeptical that this is
indeed the true lesson of Brown. In general Lazarus calls for broad
consensus among Justices in deciding controversial issues of social
2. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955).
3. See Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegration Decisions, 81 VA. L. REv.
947 (1995); Michael W. McConell, The Originalist Case for Brown v. Board of Education, 19 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'y 457 (1996).
4. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 142-50 (1991). For a more
recent, and somewhat different Ackerman narrative (that also highlights the importance of the New
Deal) see BRUCE ACKERMAN, Opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, in "WHAT BROWN
SHOULD HAVE SAID" (J.M. Balkin, ed., forthcoming).
5. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 145-
70 (1980) (linking Brown to the vision of United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
n. 4 (1938).
6. See Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L.
REV. 747, 788-814 (1991); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights
Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7 (1994); Michael J. Klarman, Brown v. Board of Education: Facts and
Political Correctness, 80 VA. L. REV. 185 (1994).
7. See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 877,
906 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 31, 50-51
(1996).
8. See EDWARD P. LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS 89-90 (1998).
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policy; for him, the critical fact to be kept in mind is the unanimity of
the Brown Court.9 Gerald Rosenberg thinks that courts are less able to
transform social policy than is commonly recognized; thus his account of
Brown highlights how little judicially-ordered desegregation actually
occurred before Congress and the President strongly weighed in with
civil rights laws and policies in the mid 1960s.1O Derrick Bell believes
that whites rarely give blacks anything unless it suits their own interests;
and so he has stressed, in an argument powerfully reinforced by Mary
Dudziak, that Brown's verdict served the propaganda interests of a
Cold War America trying to win the hearts and minds of colored folk in
Africa and Asia. l1
So what, you may ask, is my account of Brown? In general, I have
argued in a wide range of contexts that the Constitution itself is a rich
source of guidance if read with care. So let's start by looking carefully at
the document. Begin at the beginning. "We the People ... do ordain
and establish this Constitution.,,12 With these bold words, the document
seems to commit itself to the project of democratic self-rule. Monarchy
and aristocracy are rejected-here, the people rule. Democracy is not
simply what the Preamble says. It is also what the Preamble does. The
Preamble announces an act, a doing, an ordainment and establishment.
And this act of constituting-of constitution-was at that time the most
democratic act in the history of planet earth. Hundreds of thousands of
ordinary folk got to vote, via elections for special ratification
conventions, on the basic ground rules for themselves and their
posterity. This kind of broad and explicit popular consent was unheard
of in most parts of the world, ruled by strongman fiat or edicts derived
from immemorial custom. None of the ancient Greek democracies had
allowed the citizenry to actually vote on the constitution itself.13 Most
state constitutions during the Revolution had not been put to a popular
vote; nor had the Declaration of Independence or the Articles of
Confederation for that matter. Thus, the Preamble's bold text and deed
should not be passed over lightly. In this Constitution, the Preamble
makes clear, We the People rule-not kings or princes or dukes or earls
or mere custom and tradition.
Popular sovereignty-rule by the people-is also the big idea of the
9. Id. at 10, 110, 323.
10. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? (1991).
11. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma,
93 HARV. L. REv. 518 (1980); Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN.
L. REv. 61 (1988); Mary L. Dudziak, The Little Rock Crisis and Foreign Affairs: Race, Resistance,
and the Image ofAmerican Democracy, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1641 (1997).
12. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
13. For this important insight, as for so many other things, I am indebted to the pioneering
work of my colleague Jed Rubenfeld. See Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104
YALEL. J.I119, 1143 (1995).
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Article IV Republican Government Clause.14 No monarchies or
aristocracies will be allowed to take root in the several states-only
republics based on self-government among free and equal citizens.IS
If we simply read these two clauses at face value, I think we could
generate an admittedly broad yet straightforward argument that neither
the federal government nor the state governments may properly pursue
Jim Crow/apartheid policies in public schools. (Remember, the Brown
case itself raised the issue of racial segregation by state officials; and its
companion case, Bolling v. Sharpe,16 required the Justices to rule on the
constitutionality of federal segregation-in particular, the racially
segregated public schools in the, District of Columbia.) The
straightforward argument against American apartheid goes like this: the
purpose and effect and social meaning of racial segregation in America
in 1954 is to create two hereditary classes of citizens-first-class (white)
citizens, and second-class (black) citizens. These two hereditary classes
are a throwback to aristocracy and monarchy, assigning citizens unequal
and intergenerationally entrenched places on the basis of birth status.
This is a violation of the deep democratic structure of our Constitution,
as exemplified by the Preamble and the Republican Government
Clause.
.A critic of this broad argument might wonder whether the
Preamble binds the state government as well as the federal government;
and might also wonder whether the Republican Government Clause,
which speaks of states, obliges the federal government to honor basic
principles of republicanism. The critic might also ask whether either of
these clauses is justiciable. Finally, the critic might wonder whether we
are overreading these two small patches of constitutional text. Is the
deep structure of the document really so dead set against hereditary
aristocracy?
I think it is, and as further evidence I would point to two other
clauses of the Constitution that are rarely noticed. Article I, section 9
forbids Congress from granting "titles of nobility" and Article I, section
10 imposes a similar ban on states. I? Here clearly are clauses that were
designed to work in tandem-we are not overreading when we consider
these clauses as a paired set.18 And these clauses are written to
condemn the idea of lordship in America: these words proclaim that
ours is a democratic republic, not an hereditary aristocracy based on
14. U.S. CaNST. art. IV. § 4.
15. For more elaboration. see Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican
Government: Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L.
REV. 749 (1994).
16. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
17. U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 and § 10, cl. 1.
18. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747,769-70 (1999).
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birth and blood. If read in a broad but straightforward way, these
clauses reinforce the simple argument against government-sponsored
segregation in public schools as follows: No government in America
can, consistent with these clauses and the broader constitutional ethos
they embody, name some Americans "lords" and others "commoners."
But if no government can name some (light-skinned Americans) "lords"
and other (dark-skinned Americans) "commoners," surely it cannot do
the same thing through racially segregated schools whose purpose and
effect and social meaning is to create a blood-based and hereditary
overclass and underclass.
Yet another reinforcing argument against Jim Crow derives from
the paired set of clauses in Article I, sections 9 and 10 prohibiting the
federal and state governments, respectively, from enacting "bills of
attainder.,,19 These anti-attainder clauses ramify broadly, but one of the
deepest ideas they embody is that no legislature may properly single
out a person by name and subject him to special penalty or ridicule or
disadvantage. Legislatures may pass general and prospective laws-"all
who henceforth commit deed X shall suffer penalty Y"-but the
legislature may not target human beings for disfavored treatment
because of who they are as opposed to what they do.20 And there is a
special historical link between attainders and "corruption of blood" in
which legislatures tried to taint or stain a person's bloodline-a link
visible in yet another clause of the Constitution that provides that "no
Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood. ,,21 If we take the
nonattainder idea seriously, it bars state and federal lawmakers from
passing laws designed to humiliate or demean all persons descended
from slaves, or all persons with black (corrupt) blood.
Here then are a variety of rather straightforward textual and
structural arguments against American apartheid. When the words of
the Founders' Constitution are read at face value, they seem to
condemn a system that creates a hereditary aristocracy fixed at birth,
and that seems aimed at humiliating the disfavored race. The
fundamental problem with these arguments, however, is that the
Founders' Constitution cannot be taken at face value-at least where
slaves are concerned.
Make no mistake: the Founders' Constitution made its peace with,
and even propped up, a regime of chattel slavery. The Framers were
ashamed to use the words "slaves" and "slavery" so the document is rife
19. u.s. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 and § 10, cl. 1.
20. For more elaboration of this view, see generally Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and
Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95 MICH. L. REV. 203 (1996).
21. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2. Note that the Philadelphia Framers initially put the Federal
Attairider Clause and the Corruption of Blood Clause side by side. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 571 (Max Farrand rev. ed., 1937).
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with euphemism here. Thus, Article I section 2 elliptically speaks of
"free persons" and "all other persons"-that is, unfree persons. Under
the rules of this section, the more unfree persons-slaves-a state
imported or bred, the more seats it got in the House of Representatives.
And under Article II, it also got more clout in the electoral college.
Indeed, the electoral college was largely designed to help slave states
such as Virginia. In a system of direct national election, Virginia would
derive no clout from her slaves, since slaves of course could not vote.
The electoral college, by contrast, enabled Virginia and other slave
states to count for more than their fair share of total national voters.
Perversely, if Virginia were to free some of its slaves, who then moved
elsewhere (say, Pennsylania), Virginia would actually lose seats in the
Congress and the electoral college. Consider also the odious rule laid
down by the Article IV Fugitive Slave Clause. This clause actually
obliged free states to play the role of slave catchers, and return human
beings to bondage when their "rightful owners" came to recapture
them.22
These and other constitutional protections of slavery suggest that
we cannot simply read the Preamble or the Republican Government
Clause, or the nobility and attainder clauses, at face value. Slavery is
surely a relic of the ancien regime, rooted in hereditary and
intergenerational inequality based on blood and birth status. In the
antebellum South, there were indeed "lords" and "serfs"
notwithstanding the nobility clause. Slave children were attainted at
birth because of their corrupt blood, despite the language of the
attainder clauses. Indeed, the point is hardly unique to these clauses.
Slavery contradicted a huge part of the Constitution if read at face
value. How could persons born on American soil be deprived of their
right to speak and to worship as they pleased? How could persons be
sentenced to life imprisonment at birth without any due process,
without any individualized adjudication of wrongdoing?
In short, the Founders' Constitution seemed to contradict itself
where slaves were concerned. Perhaps we could solve the contradiction
by saying that slaves were simply not part of "[w]e the People." Rather,
they were more like aliens among us, not entitled to be part of collective
self-governance or the regime of constitutional rights. On this reading,
however, free blacks were quite different and had to be treated in
accordance with the Preamble and the other clauses we have canvassed.
But the issue was not entirely clear-cut before the Civil War.
Proslavery and racist readers, like Roger Taney in Dred Scott,23 read the
proslavery clauses broadly, and the Preamble and other
22. U.s. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
23. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
HeinOnline -- 40 Washburn L.J. 7 2000-2001
2000] Becoming Lawyers in the Shadow ofBrown 7
antisubordination clauses narrowly. And so for decisive constitutional
support for the result in Brown and Bolling, we must turn to the
Amendments adopted after the Civil War, which emphatically
repudiated Taney's proslavery, prosubordination, racist reading of our
Constitution.
The Thirteenth Amendment abolishes slavery everywhere and
forever;24 and with this new birth of freedom our contradiction
evaporates. No longer are we forced to read the Preamble or the other
clauses we have canvassed at less than face value. The Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments provide even clearer and more emphatic
support for the idea that our Reconstructed Constitution is refounded
on principles of free and equal citizenship. The first sentence of the
Fourteenth Amendment confers birthright citizenship on all born in
America-black and white, male and female, rich and poor alike.25 All
are citizens-and the clear idea here is that all are equal citizens. As the
elder Justice Harlan put the point more than a century ago, "[a]ll
citizens are equal before the law.,,26 (Note that this citizenship clause
applies to the federal government as well as the states.) In the next
sentence, the word "equal" explicitly appears, promising that all
persons-black as well as white-will receive "equal protection."
(Although the words of this clause speak explicitly of states, I have
elsewhere shown how they were understood as declaring precepts that
bound federal officials as well.t Finally, the Fifteenth Amendment
makes clear that blacks cannot be excluded from their equal right to
participate in the grand project of American democratic self-rule.28
With all these clauses in view, the basic argument for Brown and
Bolling is clear and clean: Jim Crow in 1954 is not truly equal. American
apartheid is an effort to create a kind of subordinated caste in violation
of the vision of the Thirteenth Amendment; to perpetuate two classes of
unequal citizenship in violation of the logic of the first sentence of the
Fourteenth Amendment; to deprive blacks of genuinely equal laws in
violation of the command of the next sentence of the Fourteenth
Amendment (and of the companion Fifth Amendment); and to keep
blacks and whites apart in ways that undercut the promise of the
Fifteenth Amendment that Americans of different races must come
together-at the polls, in the legislature, in the jury box-to govern
ourselves.
24. U.s. CONST. amend. XIII.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
26. Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 591 (1896).
27. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 280-83
(1998); Akhil Reed Amar, Constitutional Rights in a Federal System: Rethinking Incorporation and
Reverse Incorporation, in BENCHMARKS: GREAT CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSIES IN THE
SUPREME COURT 71 (Terry Eastland ed., 1995).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
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It remains to consider s.ome obvious objections to this account.
Some argue that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment stated that
their Amendment would not prohibit segregation. How then can we
read their Amendment to do exactly what they denied it would do? I
submit that this criticism underreads the text of the Amendment, and
overreads the legislative history. The text calls for equal protection,
pure and simple. There is no textual exception for segregation, no
clause that says "segregation is permissible even if unequaL" Nor did
the sponsors think that there was such a categorical exception. They
merely argued that separation was not ipso facto unequal and
unconstitutional. And as a matter of logic they were right. Logically, it
is possible to imagine some kinds of separation that are not unequal.
For example, separate bathrooms for men and women today are not
widely understood-by either men or women-as invidious or
stigmatizing or subordinating. Not yet, at least. But in some places and
at some times, separate bathrooms might indeed be a way of keeping
women down. By 1954, I submit, it was clear that racially separate
schools-and racially separate bathrooms, for that matter-were not
equal in purpose or effect of social meaning. They were a way of
keeping blacks down. Blacks knew it-as any secret ballot vote among
them would have revealed. And whites knew this too, in their hearts,
though many denied it with their lips.
Admittedly, Jim Crow had a different legal form than the 1860s
Black Codes that the Fourteenth Amendment framers explicitly sought
to outlaw. But it had the same purpose and effect and social meaning:
keeping blacks down and depriving them of equal status. The 1860s
Black Codes-which the Fourteenth Amendment framers clearly aimed
to prohibit as a "paradigm case" of impermissible legislation29-were
formally asymmetric: they imposed disabilities on blacks but not whites.
Jim Crow was formally symmetric-blacks could not go to school X, but
whites were likewise barred from attending school Y. But formal
symmetry does not mean the law is automatically valid; it just means the
law is not automatically invalid (as the Black Codes were). Thus, we
must look to a Jim Crow law in its entirety, and ask whether it really is
equal in purpose and effect and social meaning. It is possible to imagine
some parallel universe where blacks as well as whites truly wanted
separation, where no stigma attached to separation, where separation
was not simply a way of keeping blacks down. But that was not the
world of 1954, to any honest observer.
Note also that on my account, certain forms of affirmative action
need not, perhaps, be seen as the legal and moral equivalent of Jim
29. For more elaboration of "paradigm cases" and their significance, see Rubenfeld, supra
note 13, at 1169-79.
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Crow. Consider for example the kind of educational affirmative action
Justice Powell was willing to endorse in Bakke. 3D Does this kind of
affirmative action in effect make racial minorities a favored aristocracy?
Is its purpose and effect and social meaning to demean or humiliate or
attaint whites, or keep whites down? Is its ultimate aim a two-class
society of unequal castes? Is it truly the legal and moral equivalent of
the 1860s Black Codes? These are some (though they are not the only)
questions that my approach would invite us to ask.
Now consider another possible objection to my account. Some
have argued that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited only violations
of "civil rights" as opposed to "social rights" and "political rights."
Even if we accept this view, it cannot justify a system of government-
mandated apartheid in public education. To see why, let's take a closer
look at the categories of "political rights" and "social rights."
"Political rights"-paradigmatically voting, militia service, jury
service, and officeholding-were repeatedly and emphatically claimed by
the supporters of Fourteenth Amendment to lie beyond the reach of
Section One.31 A textualist, of course, is entitled to ask where the words
of the Amendment signal this limitation of scope. The textual answer is
as follows: the Fourteenth Amendment language of "privileges" and
"immunities" of "citizens,,32 is adapted from Article IV, which in general
demands that State A not discriminate against visiting citizens of sister
State B. If State A allows its citizens to own real property, it must allow
visitors from State B to do the same. Likewise for a vast range of "civil"
rights such as the rights to contract, sue and be sued, testify in court,
worship, speak, move about, and own a business. But a visitor from
State B is not entitled to serve inState A's militia or jury or legislature,
or to vote in State A's elections, on equal terms with the citizens of
State A. These "political rights" lie beyond the scope of Article IV-and
so too they lie beyond the scope of the similar language of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as the Court ruled in an 1875 case, Minor v.
Happersett. 33 Nor is the language of "equal protection" designed to
apply to voting and other political rights. This language applies not
merely to "citizens" but to all "persons"-paradigmatically aliens who do
not have a constitutional right to vote.
It is possible that later constitutional developments and
amendments-especially the Fifteenth and the Nineteenth
Amendments-should incline us to read Section One of the Fourteenth
more broadly in retrospect so as to encompass even political rights; but
30. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
31. See AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 27, at 216-18, 271.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
33. 88 U.S. 162 (1874).
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to pursue this possibility now would take us far afield. For now, it
suffices to say that even if we read the Amendment to exempt "political
rights" such as voting and jury service, Brown was not, strictly speaking,
a voting rights case but an education case. Public education is not
strictly limited to voters, or as tightly linked to voting as, say, jury
service.34 And if it were so tightly linked, the rules of the Fifteenth
Amendment-forbidding race discrimination in voting-would pick up
wherever the Fourteenth Amendment left off. Other clauses governing
political rights-such as the Republican Government Clause and Section
2 of the Fourteenth Amendment-would also come into play. So
whether government-mandated apartheid in public education is deemed
a violation of "civil rights" or of "political rights" or of both, it is
unconstitutional.
So much for "political rights." What about "social rights?" Here,
the basic claim is that the Fourteenth Amendment does not compel
"social equality" between the races. This is what many supporters of the
Amendment said; and once again we are entitled to ask where the text
says anything of the sort. And the answer I think is as follows: as a
private citizen, you will remain free to be, bluntly, a racist. You can
view your race as superior, and you are free, for example, to refuse to
invite members of other races to your private dinner parties. The
textual basis for this continued freedom is what we today call the "state
action" doctrine: the Fourteenth Amendment limits governments, but
does not impose the same restrictions on private citizens. A
government may not enact a Black Code, but a private citizen is free to
have a kind of Black Code for his dinner guests: no blacks allowed at
the Smith house.
But Brown of course was not about private dinner parties. The
government was mandating segregation-it forbade even students of
different races who wanted to socialize together in school from doing so
in the public system. The issue might have been trickier had the
government set up three schools-one for blacks, one for whites, and
one open to both-with perfect freedom of choice among the schools.
Such a scheme might seem to allow genuine "private choice" and
"social" freedom not to associate-but even here there is ground for
skepticism. Would the choice genuinely be free, and untainted by past
governmental discrimination or current pressure?35 Why only three
schools, and not, say, four? For example, what about Asian
Americans? Would they be obliged to go to the mixed school whereas
34. On the jury-voting linkage, see Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation
Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 203 (1995).
35. See Paul Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal,
86 COLUM. L. REV. 728, 789 (1986).
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blacks and whites had choices? And what if a "black" decided that she
was really "white" and insisted on attending the school for whites?
Wouldn't the government need to enforce its scheme with an odious set
of Nuremberg laws specifying the precise percentage of blood that
made a person "black" or "white?" (This issue is less problematic, as a
practical matter, for sex-segregated bathrooms, given the conventional
view that sex is binary-male/female-with rather few in-between cases.)
There is, of course, much more that could be said about Brown, but
I hope I have said enough to give you a sense of the constitutional issues
as I see them. I would like to conclude by drawing three lessons of the
case for those of us who live professional lives in law.
The first lesson is holism. In law, as in life, try to see the big
picture. I have suggested that a complete account of Brown requires us
to confront several parts of our Constitution, and to synthesize the
meaning of both the Creation era (which gave us the Founders'
Constitution) and the Reconstruction experience (which gave us a new
birth of freedom in Amendments XIII-XV). The practice of law can
sometimes be narrowing-one becomes an expert in subparagraph
4(A)(ii) of Section 1723 of some code or other, and one spends much of
one's professional life immersed in that subparagraph. So too, the
practice of constitutional interpretation can sometimes be narrowing-
clausebound, in John Ely's fine phrase. I suggest that we resist the
narrowing impulse. Good constitutional interpretation is marked by a
view of the whole as well as the part; peripheral vision is important.36
And so too, good lawyering is attentive to how various laws and social
policies intersect and interact in kaleidoscopic ways.
The second lesson is humility. Lawyers have done great good, but
we have often been on the wrong side of history. Dred Scott read the
Constitution in a mean and perverse way.. The Supreme Court in
Brown was part of the solution, but let's not forget that the Supreme
Court in Plessy v. Ferguson3? was part of the problem. Remember, the
Court itself had blessed Jim Crow in Plessy, calling racial separation
"equal" when it was not. This explicit blessing helped entrench
American apartheid, leading to huge injustice for many years in many
places. The Court in 1954 had blood on its hands. But the Brown
Court did not apologize for Plessy; indeed, it did not even overrule it.
The Justices merely said that Plessy did not apply to public education.
A candid confession of error, I suggest, is often better than a stubborn
refusal to admit one's past mistakes. This is true of the Court, but it is
36. Here, as elsewhere, I have benefitted from the wisdom of my great friend and colleague,
Charles Black. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCfURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (1969).
37. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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also true of lawyers in general.
The final lesson is humanity. American apartheid was an
oppressive, soul-deadening and degrading system of subordination, yet
many persons at the time supported it or acquiesced in it. The same
thing could be said of antebellum slavery. But we are hardly at the end
of history today. Are there similar injustices, inhumanities, and systems
of subordination today that we are ignoring or even supporting? Is the
distribution of wealth in our society-or in the world-a just and humane
one? Does our law continue to demean and degrade some persons
because of morally irrelevant traits fixed at birth-sexual orientation,
perhaps? Tonight is a time for feasting-for good food, good drink,
good talk. But for those of you who want to use your law degrees to
make the world a slightly better place, take heart and take note: there is
much work to be done.
